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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-3937 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
WILLIE PARKER 
also known as  
Chill 
 
Willie Parker, 
                     Appellant                         
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 3-04-cr-00208-001) 
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 9, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and BARRY, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion Filed: July 16, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge
 Defendant Willie Parker appeals from the District Court’s order denying his 
motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  His counsel has 
. 
2 
 
moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  Because we 
agree with counsel that there are no non-frivolous arguments in support of Parker’s 
appeal, we will affirm.1
I. 
    
Parker was charged with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute in excess of 50 grams of cocaine base (“crack cocaine”) and cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and with aiding and abetting the possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  Parker 
pled guilty to violating § 846.  In the plea agreement, Parker stipulated to his qualifying 
as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  The Presentence Report 
set forth two Guidelines calculations.  First, it calculated Parker’s offense level for 
violating 21 U.S.C. § 846 to be 27.   Then, it provided that, pursuant to the career 
offender guideline, Parker’s offense level was 32 and his criminal history placed him in 
Category VI.  See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) (2004).  The Presentence Report applied a 3-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1.  Therefore, Parker’s 
offense level as a career offender was 29.  Section 4B1.1(b) of the Guidelines provides 
that “if the offense level for a career offender . . . is greater than the offense level 
otherwise applicable, the offense level from the table in this subsection shall apply.”  
Thus, the Presentence Report recommended using the career offender offense level of 29, 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3582(c)(2).  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See United 
States v. Edwards, 309 F.3d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2002).   
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and with a criminal history in category VI, the Guidelines sentencing range was 151-188 
months’ imprisonment.  In the plea agreement, however, the government agreed to 
recommend a 114-month sentence.  The District Court accepted the plea agreement and 
the government’s recommendation.  It sentenced Parker to 114 months’ imprisonment, 
three years’ supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.   
 In December 2009, Parker moved for a reduction of his sentence under § 
3582(c)(2)2
 
 in light of the 2007 and 2008 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 
affecting crack cocaine offenses.  On June 1, 2010, the District Court stayed the 
proceeding pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Dillon v. United States, -- U.S. --, 
130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010).  On July 6, 2010, the District Court denied Parker’s motion.  
Parker appealed, and, in a per curiam opinion, we summarily remanded the case pursuant 
to Local Appellate Rule 27.4 in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Freeman v. 
United States, -- U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011).  On October 13, 2011, the District Court 
again denied Parker’s motion to reduce his sentence, and found that the Guidelines range 
both pre- and post-amendments was 151-188 months, in both instances based on an 
offense level of 29 and a criminal history placing Parker in category VI.  (App. 3.)   
                                              
2 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides that a district court may, “after considering the factors 
set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable,” reduce a defendant’s term 
of imprisonment “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) . . . if such a reduction is 
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 
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II. 
Under Anders, if court-appointed “counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, 
after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request 
permission to withdraw.”  386 U.S. at 744.  That request must be accompanied by an 
adequate brief discussing “anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.”  
Id.  A brief is adequate when counsel has thoroughly scoured the record in search of 
appealable issues, and has explained why those issues are frivolous.  United States v. 
Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000).  After we determine whether counsel has met 
his requirements under Anders, we independently examine the record for any non-
frivolous issues.  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  Where 
counsel’s brief is adequate, we will confine our inquiry to issues raised by counsel in his 
Anders brief and by the defendant in his pro se brief.  Id. at 301.  Parker has not filed a 
pro se brief. 
Counsel raises one potentially non-frivolous issue:  whether the District Court 
erred in denying Parker’s motion to reduce his sentence under § 3582(c)(2) based upon 
the 2007 and 2008 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines affecting the sentencing 
recommendations for crack cocaine offenses.  Because the issue presented here involves 
a legal question as to Parker’s eligibility for a reduction, we review the District Court’s 
decision de novo.  See United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 277 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2009).   
In Freeman, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, held that defendants who 
plead guilty pursuant to an agreement that recommends a particular sentence be imposed 
may still be eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2).  131 S. Ct. at 2693.  
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Notwithstanding this decision, here, the District Court correctly concluded that, although 
Parker’s plea agreement did not necessarily foreclose his eligibility for a sentence 
reduction, Parker’s status as a career offender did prevent the District Court from 
reducing his sentence.  In United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2009), 
we held that the 2007 and 2008 amendments to the Guidelines affecting crack cocaine 
offenses did not apply to a defendant whose sentence was clearly based on the 
defendant’s status as a career offender.  Mateo is directly on point here.  As in that case, 
Parker’s sentence was clearly based on his status as a career offender.  The plea 
agreement, which the District Court accepted, stated that Parker qualified as a career 
offender.  Therefore, his offense level remained 29 no matter whether the crack cocaine 
amendments affected Parker’s offense level absent his career offender status because § 
4B1.1(b) of the Guidelines provides that the greater of the two offense levels shall apply.  
Because the 2007 and 2008 amendments do not affect the sentencing range applicable to 
Parker, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize the District Court to reduce his sentence.   
Accordingly, we conclude that counsel’s Anders brief is adequate on its face.  We 
further find no non-frivolous arguments in support of Parker’s appeal.  We will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court, and, in a separate order, grant counsel’s motion to 
withdraw.  
 
